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1. INTRODUCnON 
In 1969 the former guerrilla movement Sandinist Front for National Liberation (Frente 
Sandinista de la Liberación Nacional: FSLN) presented its historica! program, and promised 
inter dia 'timely and adequate credit' to small and medium-sized producers in agriculture.' 
Later in 1980, when it held govemment power and presented its first economie plan, it was 
stated that the financial system would serve as 'the spine of all govemment programs to be 
executed' (BCN/INIES, 1988:12). The first statement refers to access to credit of 
marginalized farmers and is thus limited to one aspect of the performance of financial 
system. The second statement shows that eleven years later, attention had shifted to the 
potential of the financial system as a means to achieve revolutionary development goals.' 
A starting point for this article is that the financial system was deliberately used by the 
Sandinists in order to achieve social, economie and political goals associated with their 
revolution. This is radically different from the assumption of Von Pischke et al. (1981:4), 
who supposes that policy makers in developing countries wish to create 'a viable farm credit 
system or intermediary capable of providing an increasingly wider array of services of an 
acceptable Standard to an expanding clientèle of farmers.' The case of Nicaragua is not 
unique; most developing countries have been preoccupied with broader development goals, 
rather than that they bothered about the performance of the financial system as such. 
In this article we will show that notwithstanding the fact that the Sandinist govemment 
used the financial system to achieve certain 'revolutionary' goals, bis predictions about the 
performance of such a system, have proven to be partly valid. A central thesis of Von 
Pischke is that a 'consistent selection of suboptimal alternatives' with respect to loan 
portfolio management leads to negative cumulative results, because: a. the range of services 
is not widening; b. the clientèle of small farmers is not expanding; and c. the farm credit 
system is not fmancially viable in the long run (ibid:2-4). We will demonstrate that similar 
tendencies have been noticed in Nicaragua with respect to a. and c. The initial result 
1
 Sec: the Historie program of the FSLN, in: Rouet and Vandenneer (1986:181) 
1
 The emphasis on govemment programs WM a renilt of the Sandinist conviction that the state could act ai a promoter of 
sustained economie development based on different relations in production, in order to abolish the prerevolutionary 
'exploitative' model. See: FSLN (1979), Anflisi» de covuntura v tarea» de la Revolución Pooular Sandinista 
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concerning b. differed sharply from Von Pischke's prediction. The way the third tendency 
manifested itself in Nicaragua is unique, as will be shown below. 
A final evaluation of the Sandinist credit policy should have another base though man 
these observations. We have to take into account the policy objectives as formulated by the 
former Nicaraguan government after the revolution of 1979, and estimate the extent to 
which these goals have been realized. The degree at which resources have been transferred 
to politically favoured productive sectors, is an example of an indicator which is more 
suitable to measure the effectiveness of the Sandinist credit policy, which is radically 
different from the criteria related to the performance of the financial sector itself, as pro-
posed by Von Pischke. 
The remaining part of this article is divided in six parts. Section 2 introduces the 
historical context of the revolutionary credit policy of the eighties, and analyzes the per-
formance of the financial system during the Somoza period. In section 3 we will discuss the 
policy objectives related to credit policy during the Sandinist era. Section 4 sets out how the 
institutions of the financial system were altered during the first years of the revolution, and 
analyzes the causes of infiation, showing what a 'revolutionary context' in practise has 
meant: interna! and extemal political tensions, war and destruction. In section 5 we discuss 
the results of the agricultural credit program, in relation to the Sandinist policy goals. In 
section 6 the sustainability of these results will receive explicit attention, and in section 7 
conclusions will be presented. 
Throughout this study, we had to deal with problems of scarcity and sometimes poor 
quality of prevailing secundary studies and data as regards the postrevolutionary financial 
system and pursued credit policies. This is almost inevitable in a revolutionary context, 
taking into account the velocity with which changes take place; the scarcity of human 
resources; strong political opposition (internal and external) seducing the analyst to become 
more politicised than should be; and the overall political, economie, and social turmoil. 
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2 . NICARAGUA ON THE VERGE OF A REVOLUTION: THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM DURING THE 
PREREVOLUnONARY YEARS 
Normally, a financial system is divided in a formal and informal sector. In our view, the 
formal sector comprises all entities which have a legal status and can be controUed by a 
goverment. We consider the informal sector as a rest group, outside the sphere of govem-
ment regulation. 
In Nicaragua, there is little information available about the informal sector of the financial 
market. This is true for the pre- and post-1979 period; information is not only scarce but 
also, and to a certain extent, contradictory. Perceptions of the informal market thus have a 
speculative character. For example, it has been estimated that in 1978 the informal sector 
channelled only 4.2 percent of all credit, leaving 95.8% of all ronds circulating in the formal 
sector (BCN/INIES, 1988:1). This appears to be an underestimation of the role of the 
informal sector.' On the other hand, it has been emphasized that small producers in the 
agricultural sector did not have sufficiënt access to formal credit, and had to recur to 
informal loans oflarge producers (see e.g., CIERA, 1989b:78), suggesting that the informal 
sector was indeed important, altfaough at the same time exploitative in character for the 
largest group of producers, i.e., small farmers. 
The formal sector was supervised by the Central Bank of Nicaragua (BCN), and included: 
1. a group of commercial banks (collecting savings and disbursing short and medium term 
credit); 2. state banks, e.g., the investment bank INFONAC and the Banco Nacional de 
Nicaragua (BNN; both specialized in disbursing long term credit); 3. specialized savings 
institutes (SNAP and BCP: relending ronds to the construction sector and disbursing 
consumer credit); and 4. a rest group of financial intermediaries, like insurance companies 
and the -USAID sponsored- small farm credit program INVTERNO. The pre-1979 formal 
financial market was apparently competitive, with gradually less Central Bank interference 
but for long term and agricultural credit. 
The three most important commercial banks (Banco de America, Banco Nicaraguënse 
5
 In other developing countriei a much higher participation of the informal sector wai found, from 39 up to 92 percent for 
India and Nigeria retpectively (Hoffand Stiglitz, 1990:6). 
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(BANIC) and the Banco de Centroamérica (BAMER)) have been considered to serve mainly 
the interests of new industries producing for the Central American Common Market, the 
housing/construction sector, the agroexport sector, and enterprises owned by Somoza, his 
relatives and members of his government (BCN/INIES, 1988:6). According to the authors 
of the latter study, INFONAC and BNN directed a major part of their fonds towards the 
Somoza clan, financing mostly 'speculative' projects, in which these banks -in turn-
participated. The resulting perception was that bankers' interests were closely intertwined 
with those of the dominant economie classes, leading to a high concentration of loan 
portfolios. 
Data confirm the perceived bias of the financial system towards some economie sectors 
and social classes. In the first place, funds were channelled from agriculture to other 
economie sectors. While in 1960 agriculture still absorbed 40 percent of all formal credit, 
twenty years later this percentage had fallen to 20 percent. Consequently, the participation 
of industry, commerce and construction rosé from 60 to 80 percent in the same period. 
Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s agricultural credit was disbursed mostly to large 
producers of export crops. Agroexports absorbed on average 90 percent of agricultural 
credit during this period, while the area under these crops made up at most half of total 
arable land. On the other hand, food crops occupied 50-60 percent of total cultivated area, 
and got only 10 percent of agricultural credit. As small farmers constituted 73 percent of all 
agricultural production units, cultivating only 13 percent of total arable land with, primarily, 
food crops, the above data constitute sufficiënt evidence that most small farmers did not 
receive formal credit (Carter, 1989). 
In this context, a special governmental effort to reverse the marginalised position of small 
farmers, by means of a fixed quotum of BNN-loans to be disbursed as small loans (a 
measure taken in 1959), was considered as insufficiënt from the later revolutionary point of 
view. The above mentioned programme INVIERNO was considered geographically limited 
and duplicating the clientèle of the BNN (Enriquez and Spalding, 1987:111).' So, in spite 
of these efforts, in 1978 only 28,000 small farmers received formal credit, constituting 
4
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facilitating the diffucion of technology and the icduction of operattonal costa', and the me of innovative computerized 
management tyitemi (tee Bathrick & Gomez Casco, in: Von Piachke et al., 1983:206-211). The authon reported 8,500 
farmers having been reached by the program, which was not «ufficient for the Sandiniftai. 
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eighteen percent of their total number (estimate by Barraclough, 1982). This confirms the 
CIERA-view that credit needs of small farmers had to be met by the informal sector. 
The Sandinists had several reasons to perceive this limited access to credit of small food-
producing farmers as unjust and producing inequality. Firstly, credit to agriculture was 
rationed for being risky business while banks did finance risky projects in other sectors. 
Secondly, small farmers were asked for loan guarantees, while producers belonging to one 
of the mentioned dominant economie sectors were on that ground alone found eligible as a 
bank cliënt, and not on the basis of normal bank criteria. The Sandinist interpretation was 
that the financial system was politicized (BCN/INIES, 1988:6, 30). 
In other words, it could be said that during the prerevolutionary period credit was 
channelled intensively towards a few eligible producers.' This kind of rationing is a 
corollary of imperfect information, a basic characteristic of rural financial markets in 
developing countries. In turn, imperfect information is a result of the high cost of assessing 
the risk of default for (classes of) clients, ensuring that a cliënt undertakes those actions 
which make repayment likely, and even enforcing clients to repay (Hoff and Stiglitz, 
1990:237). So a bankmanager may not feel any stimulus to consider the productive and 
commercial conditions of a farmer group A, which are not favourable enough to compensate 
the uncertainty about the risk of default, while believing that the opposite is true for group 
B. In doing so, he will apply simple rules ofthumb per group: group A will not and group 
B will receive a loan. 
In prerevolutionary Nicaragua this may have occurred simply along the lines of socio-
economic classes. Small farmers in the agricultural sector were then excluded from bank 
credit because they belonged to group A, via the mechanism of requiring guarantees they did 
not have. Large producers in the same sector, plus those belonging to the industrial, 
commercial, or construction sector, received large amounts of credit, which did not maintain 
any relation with the guarantee offered, just because they belonged to group B. In con-
clusion, during the Somoza-period existed a thin line between commercial criteria applied in 
5
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the form of rules of thumb, and political favouritism. 
There is more however. The unequal distribution of agricultural credit took place in a 
context of a dual agrarian structure, with a growing large scale agroexport sector and a 
marginalized small scale food producing sector, where the rural masses impoverished. As 
the Sandinists believed that the distribution of credit critically contributed to this situation, 
rationing rules would be altered as soon as they would come to power. 
Another reason for justifying this stance, were the events at the time of the final insurrec-
tion (1978-1979), when large amounts of credit were disbursed just to be changed in dollars 
and join the capital flight. Loans were not repaid, savings were withdrawn, while indebt-
ness with foreign banks was already relatively high. In the meantime, the Central Bank 
liberalized interest rates that traditionally had been controlled. But while the policy to 
simplify (and where possible eliminate) controls and prescriptions was just being imple-
mented, the capital flight obliged the Bank to take restrictive measures. These were not 
effective due to political unrest and public insecurity which was stronger than any measure 
or market force. Central Bank policies to increase agricultural and long term credit (special 
quotas) aimed to correct its traditional neglect, but failed. Industrial and commercial lending 
continued to increase, and capital flight was not stopped. 
These events confirmed the postrevolutionary government in its conviction that the 
financial system in the Somoza-period was politicized and exclusive. Therefore, it would 
transform the financial system according to the so called logic of the majority (FSLN:1979, 
economie section). The 'revolutionary' financial system was thus a reaction to its politicized 
and exclusive predecessor; it would maintain the first characteristic while changing the 
latter: its exclusivism. 
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3 . OBIECTIVES OF THE SANDINIST ECONOMIC POLICY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE 
SUPPLY OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
The foregoing section shows that the distribution of credit among economie sectors and 
social classes of producers was the central theme in the debate on the performance of the 
prerevolutionary financial system. For this reason we will focus here on postrevolutionary 
objectives, referring to tfae credit policy, even though credit is one side of the coin only, and 
the mobilisation of savings being the other one. 
It is not easy at all to determine specific objectives the Sandinist government held with 
their credit policy, because of its subordination to the revolutionary transformation process. 
The latter was meant to be rather comprehensive, taking into account that the FSLN con-
ceived the logic of the inherited economie model to be based on exploitation and depend-
ence, at the national level as well as internationally. The basic commitment of the Sandi-
nists was to 'initiate a process of structural transformation of the social and economie order, 
in order to maximize welfare of the poorest people, taking into account the economie reality 
of tfae country.' (BCN/INIES, 1988:12; and Spalding, 1987:4). The role of the financial 
system would be redefined according to this commitment. 
FitzGerald (1987:195) distinguishes three fundamental objectives of the structural transfor-
mation process: 1) the intention to raise the Standard of living of the poor by providing for 
'basic needs', via a direct redistribution of incorae; 2) the aim to initiate a more balanced 
economie growth centred in the agricultural sector, by means of a redistribution of produc-
tive assets; 3) the reduction of the vulnerability of the economy to external factors, especial-
ly with respect to dependence on foreign financial resources and uncertain terms of trade. 
In short, the Sandinists pursued a policy of economie self-determination and redistribution. 
The state would have a leading role in the realization of the transformation, and — as 
stated above — the financial system would serve as the spine of all government programs. 
A first step to make this possible, was the nationalization of all formal financial institutions 
one week after the revolution, giving the state direct control over all financial resources. 
This allowed the government to reorientate the distribution of credit according to redis-
tributive and productive goals. Other reasons to nationalise tfae financial system were related 
8 
to the required reduction of the vulnerability of the economy to extemal factors, and its state 
of bankniptcy at the end of the war against Somoza. The new financial system were 
assigned the following functions: 
1) create broad access to credit for the peasantry, initially motivated by a politica! will to 
compensate them for their traditional marginality and sacrifices made during the 1978/79 
war; 
2) stimulate the process of structural transformation in the agricultural sector, by 
consolidating and capitalizing the emerging state sector and cooperatives; 
3) promote production in all economie sectors, and stimulate productivity in the long run. 
In particular, a quick recuperation of domestic food and agroexport production was to be 
achieved, as production in these sectors had fallen during the 1978/79 war. 
Tfais enumeration synmesizes other ones. Spoor (1989:1-2) stated that the credit policy 
goals were related to the reactivization of postwar production, democratization of credit 
leading to smal! scale accumulation and a higher integration in markets, and the transform-
ation of agriculture. Barahona (1989:37) presented the promotion of production, capitaliz-
ation of the revolutionary productive sectors, and structural transformation of the economy 
as policy goals. Our synthesis is based on three leading principles: democratization, 
agrarian transformation, and promotion of production. 
Note that the three functions of the financial system correspond to the fundamental 
objectives of the process of structural transformation as listed by FitzGerald,' and that each 
implies one objective. These three objectives concern primarily the agricultural sector. As 
the state held control over financial resources, and the major structural transformation was to 
be realised in agriculture, credit policy could be shifted towards agriculture. So, the volume 
and distribution of agricultural credit is of central interest. 
The above stated functions will serve as starting points for an evaluation of the Sandinist 
agricultural credit policy. In section 5 three criteria will be formulated, each related to one 
function. First of all, however, the institutional changes following the nationalization of the 
' Notice dut the fint function is related to the fint and the aecond fundamental goal of the revolution; the other two 
correspond to the identically numbered revolutionary objective». 
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financial system are described in the next section (4.1). Subsequendy, die operational 
features of the system, with special reference to agricultural credit, wül be dealt with in 
section 4.2. 
4 . THE REVOLUTIONARY FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
4.1: The institutional reform of the financial system 
Two years after die nationalization of the banking system in July 1979, all financial 
institutions were clustered according to die main economie activities, and specialised in 
lending to me corresponding sector of the economy. The changes can be summarised in die 
following scheme: 
SCHEME 1: die reorganisation of die Nicaraguan banking system in 1981 
nistoning banki/iutitutions absorbing bank apecialiaation 
1. MFONAC, Bank Calley Dagnall Banco Nacional de Deiarrouo 
(BND) 
agricultural credit 
2. FINSA, FIDOSA, FIA & Banco Exterior Banco de America (BAMER) agroinduatiy, foreitry 
3. INDESA, FRANCOFIN, INTERFINANCIERA, 
CNI & Banco de Centro America 
Banco NicaragOenae (BANIC) induatry, commerce 
4. FINANCIERA, INMOBILIARIA, CAPSA, 
NIAFSA 
Banco Inmobiliario conatruction, tourism 
5 . - Banco Popular raiall and medium enter-
priae, conaumption 
Source: Viaaer, 1990:19 
In December 198S, BAMER merged with BANIC. The new cluster would be at the 
service of die commercial and industrial sector, and left Nicaragua with four banks, each 
specialised in its own predefined sector. These banks, together with die National Fund for 
Investments (Fondo Nacional de Inversiones: FNI), constituted die National Financial 
System (Sistema Financiero Nacional: SFN). 
The specialised nature of die SFN combined with a high degree of centralisation of die 
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decision-making process concerning the allocation of credit. A 'financial cabinet supervised 
the BCN and the SFN, and dictated the financial/economic policies to be applied' (BCN/-
INIES, 1988:21). By centralizing decisions and creating a sectorally specialized financial 
system, credit policy was subordinated to overall revolutionary economie policies. 
Only the disbursement and administration of credit funds was decentralised. The net 
result (i.e. of centralised policymaking and decentralised administration) was that a local 
bank branch had to comply with centrally defined politica! norms and priorities, in determin-
ing who, what, and how much would be financed. These norms were of course related with 
strategie revolutionary goals, and did not take into account normal commercial banking 
criteria. 
The emerging situation resembles the banking system of Tanzania, as described by Collier 
and Gunning (1991:534). In Tanzania, so-called 'commercial' banks functioned as 'agencies 
which channel government funds to meet certain items of recurrent public expenditure', 
rather than as intermediates who attract funds on domestic and external capital markets, in 
order to reiend these, at commercial terms, to private or public agents. In the case of 
Nicaragua, it is indeed possible to think of the resources held by the SFN as central 
government funds. Both were politically controlled in the same way and used to achieve the 
same objectives. 
4.2: The operational characteristics of the financial system 
First of all, one should recognize that the subordination of credit policy to overall 
revolutionary goals left no room to the local bank manager to take decisions whether or not 
to issue a loan to a potential cliënt on the basis of confidence, risk and transaction costs. 
This kind of entrepreneurial expertise — if it had not left Nicaragua before or just after the 
revolution — was not employed, nor developed. This complete lack of decentralized 
banking decisions leaves the question how credit was allocated. 
In the Nicaraguan revolutionary context, the sectoral allocation of credit was largely 
determined by strategie revolutionary goals. A first political directive was to increase the 
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share of agricultural and livestock credit in total SFN-credit to productive sectors. In table 1 
it can be observed that in 1983, 51 percent of this total went to agriculture, while this 
percentage had been 20 percent just before the revolution. Secondly, within agriculture 
certain social groups were to benefit from the political desire to 'democratise' credit and 
stimulate agrarian transformation. The share of small and medium producers had to rise, 
and 'revolutionary' productive sectors — the newly formed state sector 'Area Propiedad 
del Pueblo' (APP) and different types of cooperatives — would get priority in the 
allocation of credit. 
At the level of the borrower, access to credit was equalized and open. Allocation of 
credit per cliënt was only detennined by per hectare loan size rules, and the area to be 
financed. The rules took into account the technological level of production and accordingly 
calculated production costs per hectare. Though in principle credit should be complemen-
tary to farmers' own funds, the full hundred percent of production costs could be financed. 
Interest rates were maintained at their prerevolutionary (low) levels, and remained stable 
until 1985. Starting with the 1980/81 season, interest rates for so-called 'rural credit' would 
be relatively low, benefitting small and medium farmers and the cooperative sector. Within 
this credit program, interest rates were especially low for the cooperatives CAS (8%) and 
CCS (10%), and somewhat higher for individual peasants (13%). This interest rate structure 
served clearly the goal to organize small and medium producers in cooperatives, and 
secondly to stimulate its capitalisation. 
Although inflation clearly is not an 'operational characteristic' of the financial system, it 
became an important determinant of its performance during the eighties, and must therefore 
be mentioned here. As is clear from table 1, in the year of the revolution (1979) inflation 
was high, but afterwards it fluctuated around 30% yearly, until 1985. Starting with the 
latter year, inflation commenced to accelerate up to 912% in 1987. In section 5, the 
consequences of the inflationary spiral for the way credit became subsidized, and the 
distribution of the emerging grants, will be dealt with. 
In Nicaragua it was sometimes believed that the above operational features of the SFN 
was the main factor causing inflation; especially the lack of measures to indexate interest 
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rates has been a point of criticism. In order to discover to what extent this hypothesis were 
correct, a first step is to consider the nominal expansion of SFN-credit. An estimate of the 
latter was presented by BCN/1NIES (1988:24); total SFN-credit -to the central government, 
parastatal enterprises, as well as to productive sectors- rosé from 74 percent of GDP in 
1979 to 120 percent in 1984. Obviously these levels of credit granting bore no relation to 
the volume of domestic savings which became even negative in 1985 and 1986 (World 
Tables, 1989-90), presumably because after 1979 interest rates for deposits had become 
negative in real terms. 
The increasing degree of SFN-reliance on Central Bank funds initially was an important 
source of infiation.' We have to examine the composition of the loan portfolio of the SFN 
though, and take into account its lending to the central government (CG),' in order to 
specify which cliënt or sector had a relatively high share in total SFN-lending, and contrib-
uted most to its expansion. Moreover, a fact to reconsider is that the CG not only borrowed 
from the SFN, but also directly from the Central Bank (BCN). 
Basically, two tendenties may correspond with the rate of infiation; the increase of direct 
BCN-lending to the CG, and the expansion of SFN-credit. In the following paragraph we 
will examine if the CGs current budget balance (A) can be treated as a proxy for the 
increase of direct BCN-lending to the government, and tfaus as an inflationary factor. 
Before relating the second mentioned tendency, that of the expansion of SFN-credit (B), to 
infiation, we have to reconsider whether or not positive productive developments accom-
panied the credit expansion, and if net returns on SFN-operations have been positive. Net 
returns on lending can be calculated on the basis of nominal interest rates, the infiation rate, 
transaction costs and the level of default. That will be done in Section 5.2., while produc-
tive records will be subject of Section 5.3. Here we only show the possible magnitude of 
SFN-credit as a source of infiation, in case of agricultural and livestock credit. 
A: Total recurrent government expenditure rosé from 12% of GNP in 1977 to 58% of 
7
 Inflatioo wat not exceasively high though, during 1979-1985. High levels of development aid juit after the revolution 
took place, were ueed to finance the increase in public expenditure. Later, after the fint poatrevolutionary years, aid levels 
decreaied, partly ai a resuh of US-preiaure on international development institutions. On the other hand, the former Socialist 
Block increaaed ha development astistance. 
* Therefore, 'financial deepening' in Nicaragua may just be interpreted as fiacal deficit financing. 
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GNP in 1986. The current budget balance surplus in 1977 became a deficit already 
before the revolution, as Somoza too had to spend on the military. Subsequently, the 
yearly deficit became larger in an irregular way during the Sandinist period, rising 
from 0.2 million 1980 new cordobas in 1980, to 3.3 million in 1985. In absolute 
terms, the 1985 deficit was sixteen and a half times larger man in 1980. [ O n e 
would have expected a larger deficit though, contemplating the rise in recurrent gov-
ernment expenditure. The decline in the absolute level of the 1986 deficit has possibly 
been due to a decreasing level of public expenditure in red terms on wages, pensions, 
and other income transfers from the government to certain groups of citizens; and 
maybe also to higher nominal tax revenues (as a result of dysfunctions within a 
progressive tax system, e.g., when all transactions are taxed at the highest rate in an 
inflationary environment). The burden of inflation was probably borne by those who 
financially depend on the government, and by taxpayers.' ] 
In table 1, it can be apprehended that the CG became a very important BCN cliënt. 
The IMF data show that claims on the CG held by 'monetary authorities' increased 
rapidly in real terms during 1977-1983. This increase not always maintains relation 
with the current budget balance. In 1980 and 1981 for example, balances were small 
in comparison with the increase in outstanding CG-debt with monetary authorities; this 
is probably due to capital payments of the CG, which are not included in current 
expenditure. So it is probable that not onfy the current budget balance of the CG was 
financed monetarily. n 
B: As stated, another possible cause of inflation may have been the expansion of SFN-operations; 
those related to agriculture are the subject of this discussion. Table 1 shows that the total flow 
of agricultural credit fluctuated between 1.9 million new 1980 cordobas in 1979 and 3.5 million 
in 1986, with an average of 3.1 million during 1980-1986. IMF-data (International Financial 
Statistics, 1990:542-545) display that claims of monetary authorities on 'deposit money banks' 
(i.e., the state banks) increased from 1.8 million (new 1980 cordobas) in 1979 to 4.8 million in 
9
 Aaauming thua that the monetary inflation-conection waa insufficiënt. Employees working in the public aector received a 
compenaation in kind though. The ao-called 'AFA', a package containing augar, beana, oil, rice and other baaic producta, waa 
aerved out monthly to them. 
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 BCN/INIES (1988:28) data concern central bank disbursements of credit to the central government, ahowing that these 
were higher than the recurrent public expenditure. The data also indicate linie was repaid, suggesting a high proportion of total 
recurrent expenditure being monetarily financed. 
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TABLE1 
Production, inflation, government expenditure, and credit in Nicaragua (1977-87) 
(miüions of new 1980 cordobas,' 
unless indicated otherwise) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1 
Produetion: 
GNP (min. of cunent new C$) 14.2 13.4 13.8 20.5 23.1 26.6 31.1 41.0 104.5 393.2 2327.2 
Deflator (overall/GDP) 52.9 54.2 72.9 100.0 111.7 130.4 144.8 201.2 537.5 2042.3 11608.8 
GNP (defiated) 26.8 24.6 18.5 20.5 20.7 20.5 21.6 20.4 19.4 17.6 20,1 
Annual inflation (CPI) 12% 4% 48% 35% 24% 25% 31% 35% 320% 681% 912% 
Government expenditure (GE): 
Recurrent GE 3.3 4-1 3.8 5.2 6.8 83 9.6 10.7 11.3 10.2 NA 
Recurrent GE ai a % of GNP 12% 17* 21% 25% 33% 40% 44% 52% 58% 58% NA 
Current budget balance +0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -2.0 -1.4 -1.7 -3.3 -2.3 NA 
Outit. debt Gov't -> BCN 0.8 2.3 2.5 3.9 6.7 8.9 10.5 NA NA NA NA 
Agricuüural-ttvestock Credit (AC): 
AC 3.4 4.7 1.9 3.1 2.5 2.8 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.3 
AC as % of total SFN-credit (2) 20% 20% ND ND 39% 49% 51% 49% 45% ND ND 
Souree»: World tables, 1989-90 edition: row 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 (last two have been calcuiated); 
IMF, International Financial Statistici, Yearbook 1990: row 4 and 7 (calcuiated); 
Enriquez and Spalding, 1987:114 publiihed data about AC ditbunementa in current C$, which we uied to obtain part of row 8 and 10 (yean 
1977-1980); the constant values have been calcuiated using the GDP-deflator, 
Visser, 1990:21: row 8 and 10 / years 1981-1987; 
BCN/INIES, 1988:26: here, data were presented on total SFN-credit disbursements to the economie sectors mentioned in footnote 2, which 
together with the data ftom row 8 led to row 9. 
Notes: ' = with the monetary reform of february 1988, for every thousand old cordobas one new cordoba was issued; 
* = total credit fiom state banks to the predefined economie sectors agricumire, industry, commerce, tourism (thus excluding SFN-credit to the 
central government); years 1977/1978 are estimates by Spalding and Enriquez, 1985. 
CPI • ConsumerPrice Index/year averages; 
NA - Not Available; 
ND •= Not at our Disposal 
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1982. These data suggest that the central bank had to finance the expansion of SFN-
operations (including those serving the CG) and possibly also negative net returns on 
SFNs past loans. ECN/INIES data (1988:28) confirm our notion of a greater SFN-
dependence on central bank funds, showing that in 1981 49% of all BCN lending was 
absorbed by the SFN. It is plausible that its operations fuelled inflation, but we still 
do not know if this was due to increased lending to the CG, to parastatal enterprises, 
to productive sectors, and/or negative net returns on these activities. 
It is now opportune to make a final remark about the dynamics of the causes of inflation. 
FitzGerald (1987:203-204) estimates mat twothirds of the 1985 fiscal deficit was attributable 
to military spending, as a reaction to the US-sponsored contra war. This author argues that 
without the war, inflation would have been one third of what it actually was in 1985. So he 
interprets the rise in inflation as a result of increased govemment military expenditure. In 
his words 'inflation was used as a means of resource mobilization by the govemment to pay 
for the war'. 
Our data are -to a certain extent- in line with this observation; indebtness of the CG with 
monetary authorities rosé quicker than that of 'deposit money banks'; the former increased 
with 9.7 million 1980 cordobas, the latter with less than one third that amount. 
Consequently, in 1983 outstanding CG-debt with the BCN was more than two tunes greater 
than that of the SFN. Moreover, part of SFN-lending went to the CG, meaning that also a 
part of SFN-debt with the BCN was a result of obligatory SFN-lending to the CG, and 
should actually be added to CG-indebtness with the central bank. Our conclusion is thus 
that the massive increase of BCN-funds channelled to the CG, be it directly or indirectly, 
was the main source of inflation. 
As more than a half of all recurrent public expenditure concemed defense, inflation was 
indeed related with the magnitude and nature of the military response of the Sandinist 
govemment to the US-sponsored military activities of the contras. In other words, inflation 
was related with the political tensions between Nicaragua and the USA. It had neveriheless 
a severe long term impact on the performance of the financial system and the extent to 
which credit policy goals were achieved (see the next section). 
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An important lesson to learn from this section is that the international political environ-
ment set the terms for the probability of success or failure of the Sandinist credit policy. 
The link between the two is made up by inflation. 
5 . AGRICULTURAL CREDIT DURING THE SANDINIST DECADE 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Sandinist credit policy, it is proper to formulate 
clear criteria that follow direcüy from the objectives this policy and the functions of the new 
financial system, as described in Section 3. In that way, we identify the following criteria: 
1. the number of small and medium farmers who got formal credit for the first time in their 
life; 2. the degree at which resources have been transferred to prioritised ('revolutionary') 
productive sectors; and 3. the productive responses to changes in the volume and distribution 
of credit. 
We will review the operations of the National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de 
DesarroUo: BND), as to this bank the function to distribute agricultural and livestock credit 
was assigned. As was noticed before, agriculture would be in the centre of the credit policy 
because the main structural transformation, i.e., a land reform, would take place tbere. 
Furthermore, the Sandinists wanted to compensate certain social groups within agriculture 
for traditional sufferings and marginalisation, by means of the provision of credit on soft 
terms. 
The BND distinguished two types of agricultural credit; Rural Credit (RC) and Bank 
Credit (BC). The first comprises credit for small and medium-sized individual producers as 
well as for cooperatives; the latter refers to credit available to state enterprises and large 
private producers. 
Section 5.1 deals with the number of RC clients in order to discern to what extent the first 
objective of widening access to formal credit in favour of marginalized social groups (OCP 
1), was effected. Section 5.2 addresses the disbursements of credit to prioritized productive 
sectors, while at the same time identifying possible explicit and/or implicit subsidies; this is 
discussed in the light of the second objective of the Sandinist credit policy (OCP 2). 
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Finally, in Section 5.3 the third criterion will be assessed, in order to grasp whether or not 
its corresponding objective was achieved. As the Sandinist credit policy was based upon the 
perception that credit be a productive input, the productive record of agriculture will be 
reviewed." 
5.1: Effective access to the Rural Credit program 
The first OCP was to create brood access to credit for the peasant sector, in order to 
compensate it for its traditional marginality and for its sacriflces made during the anti-
Somoza war. We thus will concentrate on the number of small and medium-sized farmers 
who became new RC clients. It should be recognized that the realisation of OCP 1 was 
thought to reinforce the achievement of the other two objectives as well (i.e., that of 
strengthening 'revolutionary' sectors (ccoperatives), and raising productivity). 
The initial result concerning OCP 1 was significant: in June 1980, almost 100,000 small 
farmers (slightly more than half of their total number) received credit, thus increasing the 
RC clientèle with 233% in comparison to 1978. After 1980, however, the clientèle 
decreased slightly but steadily, with temporal recuperations though, e.g. in 1986 when the 
war obliged the government to assure itself of sufficiënt popular support in the countryside, 
which was done by increasing the effort to reach farmers with credit (see table 2). 
TABLE 2: the number of Rural Credit clients (1978-1988) 
(in thousands of families) 
1979 
28.2 
1980 
100.7 
1981 
87.6 
1982 
75.0 
1983 
79.3 
1984 
80.9 
1985 
66.4 
1986 
94.0 
1987 
75.1 
1988 
80.0 
Sourcet: CIERA 1989a:315 (yean 78, 81, 83 and 86), 1989b:328 (year 87, 88); Enriquez and Spalding, 
1987:113 (yean 79, 80, 82, 84 and 85) 
11
 Ahhough theoretically and empirically it ia difficult to eitabliah a cauial relation between a diibunement of credit and iti 
(prenimed) productive impact; wet Section 5.3.A. 
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Some comments on the table 2 data are in place. Firstly, in 1988 still 45% of the eligible 
population was reached with small credit, as follows from relating the 1988 number of small 
farmers reached to a CDERA-estimate of the total number of rural families: almost 180 
thousand (1989b: 14). Secondly, the increase of the RC-clientele was exclusively attributable 
to the organisation of small farmers in cooperatives; some 1,200 credit & services cooper-
atives and 1,300 production cooperatives were formed, organizing approximately 74,000 
farmers. The number of individual clients even decreased from 1982 till 1986, from 28,032 
to 15,987 farmers. Thirdly, our own observations in Nueva Guinea, a district in the 
southeastera part of Nicaragua, indicate that there might have occurred double-counting in 
these BND-data. The creditmanager of the local BND branch told us mat the incredible 
jump in 1980 to more than a hundred thousand clients may have included farmers who 
'received credit twice, once individually and once as a member of a cooperative, by using a 
relative to get credit for him or even by using a false name.' This was a regular practice in 
his district during the first year of the rapid expansion of the clientèle. It has not been 
possible to detect the magnitude of this bias in the above statistical data. 
Data from a 1981-census concerning farmers who mainly produced food crops, once had 
been a BND-client, or still received credit, show that 53% had received credit for the first 
time after April 1980. For small farmers (0-7 ha.) this percentage was even higher: 65.5% 
(Stanfield, 1982:41). So, disregarding the question how many were double-counted, at least 
farmers had been reached with forma! credit for Hit first time. 
Other data show how this was accomplished: firstly, half of the BND-clients had not 
shown any land title to secure the loan; secondly, some eighty percent had filled in the credit 
request with the help of a government employee; and thirdly, in 54 percent of all cases this 
was done at the farm. So, access to credit of small farmers was indeed widened, as a result 
of the poliücal will to do so. Self-selection had become the 'chief rationing criterion' 
(Carter, 1982:15). 
After 1980, however, it proved diffïcult to maintain this expanded clientèle of peasant 
producers; it even starled diminishing slightly. At the district level, in Nueva Guinea, we 
observed that the existing clientèle lived primarily in the more densely populated part of the 
district, in the village of Nueva Guinea and surroundings. Two reasons were given to 
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explain this. Firstly, bank officers ran too high a physical danger if go ing to the agrarian 
frontier to reach atomized small farmers, and secondly, production (and thus repayment) 
risks were also greater in the latter case. Both arguments are war-related. Presumably these 
factors have also played a role at the national leve!, impeding a further expansion of the RC-
clientele. 
We nevertheless cannot exclude the traditional -and more economie- reasons for the 
marginalized position of small subsistence farmers in the credit market: technological 
backwardness, irregular and at times adverse ecological conditions, and transport and 
marketing problems. In Nicaragua under Sandinist rule, the policy to supply small farmers 
with credit was partly offset by the necessity to allocate and ration scarce resources in such a 
way that the highest productive effect was expected. This policy was announced soon after 
1980, the year of the 'pifiata' (credit rain). At the demand side of the market, some farmers 
might have been reluctant to make use of their formally greater access, because they feared 
repayment problems, which in the light of past experiences were associated with expropiati-
ons. So, the official political will to widen access to credit for small farmers was confronted 
with structural problems of insufficiënt repayment capacity and confidence, and imperfect 
information, which are all basic attributes of rural financial markets. This combination of 
problems may have impeded a further increase of the RC clientèle. ° 
Given the increase in the nvanber of RC clients, the next question is now what size of 
loans the expanded clientèle received on average. Were loans smaller or larger than before 
the revolution ? We may compare the total amount of agricultural credit with the share of 
RC in this total, as well as with the number of beneficiaries; see table 3. 
u
 On the other hand, whete forma! inctitutioni «te unable to deal with the interrelated pioblemi of small farm production, 
the informal lender geu an opportunity to act, interlinking transactions in oider to teduce riskt, offering packages of services 
and goods (credit, inputf, consumer goods, garanteed sale, transport, ritk-iharing, etcetera). 
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TABLE 3: the magnitude of small credit-loans hefore and after the revolution 
1977 197 
8 
197 
9 
1980 198 
1 
198 
2 
198 
3 
198 
4 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
ToUlAC(mlnl980C$) 
Shan of RC in AC 
# of RC cliënt» (x 1000) 
average loan «ze' 
3.4 
10% 
ND 
4.7 
4% 
28.0 
6.8 
1.9 
13% 
28.2 
8.7 
3.1 
27% 
100.7 
8.3 
2.5 
23% 
87.6 
6.6 
2.8 
31% 
75.0 
11.6 
3.4 
31% 
79.3 
13.3 
3.3 
34% 
80.9 
13.9 
3.2 
34% 
66.4 
16.4 
3.5 
44% 
94.0 
16.4 
3.3 
34% 
75.1 
14.9 
2.6 
27% 
80.0 
8.8 
Sourcei: table 1 (total AC); table 2 (# of RC cliënte); Enriquez and Spalding, 1987; and Viner, 1990 (thare of RC in AC) 
': in 1980 cordobai. 
As regards the last Somoza years, 1978 in particular is characterized by great political 
uncertainty, capital fiight and abuse of credit; the share of RC was 4% only. The preceding 
year 1977 was less exceptional; 10% of all AC went to the small farm sector, and assuming 
mat the RC clientèle was as high as in 1978, the average loan size would have been C$ 12.1 
(in 1980 cordobas). 
For the Sandinist period, 1986 may be earmarked as a special year, because at the 
national level it was decided to make efforts to gain political support of small farmers, and 
deprive the contras of their social base. Credit was again used as an instrument to achieve 
an immediate political goal. Hence, the years 1978 and 1986 are best considered as 
'abnormal' years, and will not be taken into consideration here. 
We want to have an estimate of the average RC loan size during the postrevolutionary 
period. Table 3 shows first of all that during 1980-85 the average level of 3.1 millions of 
1980 cordobas disbursed as AC was slightly lower than the 1977 level. However, the share 
of small credit (RC) in total agricultural-livestock credit had risen firstly to 27% in 1980 and 
afterwards to 34% in 1984-85. So, the increase in the number of RC clients was accom-
panied by a rise in the share of small credit in total agricultural-livestock credit. 
Table 3 shows that the average RC loan size was C$ 16.4 during 1984-85; comparing this 
with an estimated C$ 12.1 for 1977, postrevolutionary RC loans were possibly even higher 
than their predecessors. We may conclude that a greater number of small farmers received 
a loan of an average size which at least was as high as before the revolution. On the 
medium term, the objective to 'democratise' credit and compensate the peasantry for its 
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marginality and sacrifices it had made during the anti-Somoza war was effectively reached. 
In the long run though, the picture changes. After 1986, the RC share started to fall 
slightly; in 1988 it was 27%, a level as high as in 1980. This was not so much due to the 
fact that the small farmer clientèle was slightly decreasing. Ratfaer, the result of correcting 
for inflation was that in real terms less credit was disbursed, reducing the level of AC in 
1987 and 1988. Apparantly, this affected more the share of RC; the reduction in real terms 
was differentiated per social group. Large producers absorbed 48% of total AC during the 
latter year (some 19 percent points higher than during the former seven years, see Visser, 
1990:21). The question is if this became a structural trend, and if so, how inflation became 
an intermediate variable in reversing the pattern of credit distribution. This issue is 
addressed in the next section. 
5.2: Disbursetnent of credit and transfer of grants to prioritised social groups 
The second OCP referred to agricultural credit as an instrument to consolidate and 
capitalize the social groups emerging with the process of agrarian transformation" The 
credit instrument would be used in two ways. Firstly, both cooperatives and the state sector 
APP would absorb an increasing part of agricultural credit. Secondly, interest rates would 
be differentiated by social group. In this subsection, we will see how these two measures 
were applied, in case of cooperatives, the APP, and individual small farmers." 
Social allocation of credit and differentiation of interest rates were policy instruments 
which were consciously used to stimulate and consolidate the agrarian transformation. Two 
other factors joined the interest rate-instrument in its function to transfer grants to the 
prioritized social groups: inflation and default rates. These factors were not controlled, so 
their contribution to the transfer was unintended, and at best accepted on an ad hoc basis. 
The below discussion is thus divided into four parts, each addressing one transfermechanism 
11
 Agrarian traniformation encompasses more than agrarian reform; it includes technologies! changes, as well ai improve-
menta in the aphere of marketing and credit. 
14
 Although die latter were not a new sector emerging with structural transformation; potitically, it was preferred that they 
integrale into the cooperative sector, and if mis integration was partial, it was hoped that individual small farmers would 
integrale more into the market economy. 
(in order of appearance). 
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It should be clear that the ultimate goal of this section is not to decide to what extent 
credit has been an effective instrument contributing to agrarian transfonnation. As several 
instruments have been implemented in combination to stimulate this complex process, it is 
impossible to isolate and identify the impact of one particular instrument. The aim we have 
here is just to see if credit was indeed distributed according to stated political priorities and 
if differentiated nominal interest rates did have any significance in practise in times of 
inflation. 
A. First unintended mechanism: default 
Of all ways in which credit transactions can evolve into transfer of grants, default is the 
most well-known and feared. Normally, it is unexpected and -if inadequate measures are 
taken- becomes uncontrolled. In Nicaragua, given the context of a strategy to provide for 
'basic needs', to redistribute income, and to compensate peasants for traditional marginality 
and war sufferings, the supply of small credit was extended initially without control 
(CIERA, 1989a:259; Enriquez and Spalding, 1987:116). It was even 'flown in' to peasants 
who could not be reached by road. The delivery of small credit was presumably intended to 
transfer income to the peasantry, most obviously so in 1980. 
During the latter year, delinquency rates were indeed relatively high for the RC program, 
as well as for APP-credit. Precise data are not available. The SFN-definition of the nominal 
repayment rate is: total repayments in year t as a percentage of new disbursements (in the 
same year!). Following this definition at times of inflation and credit expansion, 'repay-
ment' automatically turns out to be low. For example, 'repayment' for the RC program in 
1980 was reported to be 26%, and in the two subsequent years 55% only. However, it may 
well be that farmers waited one year before repaying a hundred percent of the loan received 
in year [t-1], and that the amount repaid in year [t] in relation to disbursements in year [t] 
was lower than a 100% due to inflation and continued credit expansion during the first 
revolutionary years. Consequently, the rates of 26 and 55 percent may have been higher 
using a more conventional definition of nominal repayment. 
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It is sure however that also in the conventional meaning of the term nominal repayment 
was low in 1980, as in July 1983 the outstanding debt on loans received in 1980 by 
individual small farmers had to be remitted. At the same time it was announced that debts 
of cooperatives were also pardoned, in a discriminatory way, favouring the CAS-type above 
CCS and both types of cooperatives above individual producers. Cooperatives CAS were 
forgiven their 1980, 1981 and 1982 debts, while CCS-types still would have to repay their 
1982 debts. One year later, in 1984, the APP-debts were restructured by the government 
(SFN-data indicate a 'repayment' rate of 51 to 60 percent for this sector during 1981-84; 
Enriquez and Spalding, 1987:117). Mean repayment performance of large farmers was 
relatively good. In conclusion: during the first years after 1979 the 'default-mechanism' of 
transfer of resources was relevant above all for the cooperatives CAS and CCS, foliowed by 
the individual small farmers and the state sector, and less so for large producers. 
Soon after 1980 tolerance towards default became less, at least officially. A first directive 
for bank employees disbursing credit was to check its recuperability, which as such suggests 
a return to commercial banking criteria. This was not the case however, because at the 
same time the importance of (national) productive plans to be financed with credit was 
emphasized (BCN/INIES, 1988:14-15). Moreover, credit still served as an incentive to 
organize the peasantry in cooperatives. As was showed in the previous subsection, the net 
result was that less individual clients and more organized farmers received this type of 
credit. 
There is every reason to think that default of cooperatives continued to be relatively high 
during the eighties. Expectations were created that it was lucrative to do so, as there was a 
chance that the government would repeat the 1983-remission of debts. Although we do not 
have at our disposal national data concerning repayments after 1985, we do have information 
about Nueva Guinea at the end of the eighties. During the agricultural cycle 1988/89 
'repayment' by cooperatives of short-term credit was 18% for com and 22% for rice, which 
was less than the average repayment rates: 48 and 55% respectively." The cooperative 
sector has had more advantage of default than other sectors. 
13
 In 1989/90 repayment rates for the cooperative aector were 78 and 65 % for corn and beans, while district averages rosé 
to 87 and 81%. We still see a relative difference, which suggests that cooperatives profited more front default. The rise in 
these figures was a consequence of: a) measures to indexate interest rates after June 1988; b) peace talks between the 
government and contra-leaders, which reduced military activity in the area. 
B. First instrument: interest rates 
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As was shown earlier, it was intended to lower interest costs for cooperatives and small 
individual producers (RC clients), while the state and large-scale private sector paid the 
slightly higher rates. Differentiated nominal interest rates have not been significantly 
effective though, notwithstanding the fact that e.g. the nominal rate charged to a cooperative 
CAS was half the one charged to large private producers or state-enterprises. In real terms, 
interest rates became increasingly negative for all sectors, and negative interest costs for all 
sectors means transfer of grants to all sectors. The nominal difference of four, seven and 
nine percent between the BC interest rate and the three RC rates was only significant in its 
implication for how much implicit subsidy a certain cliënt group received (see table 4). 
During the first five years of the revolution inflation was moderate, and the difference 
between real interest rates for BC and RC was not that small. In 1981/82 till 84/85 e.g. a 
cooperative CAS 'paid' a real interest rate of minus 21%, while large private producers 
were 'charged' minus 12%. When inflation was as high as 912% in 1987, real interest rates 
feil to around minus 900% for everyone, elevating implicit subsidies for all cliënt groups. 
Interest rates were not indexed till June 1988. 
TABLE 4: interest rates structure for short term credit in Nicaragua (1979-1988) 
1 77/78 79/80 80/81 81/82 - 84/85 85/86 - 87/88 
Small Credit: individual 
Small Credit: CAS 
Small Credit: CCS 
13% 13% 13% 
7% 
8% 
13% 
8% 
10% 
20% 
16% 
18% 
Bank Credit: private 
Bank Credit: APP 
13% 14% 17% 
17% 
17% 
17% 
30% 
30% 
Annual inflation' 12% 48% 35% 29% 641% 
Source: CIERA, 1989a:261 (till 1984); Spoor, 1989:6 (1985-88); table 1 (IR) 
' : inflation rate for 81/82-84/85 and 85/86-87/88 are averagei 
In conclusion: the policy to differentiate nominal interest rates has not been effective in 
reducing financial costs for certain favoured sectors, because of inflation. As stated in 
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section 4, inflation was generated for twothirds by increased govenunent expenditure on the 
military. In other words, the interest rate policy could not be effective because there was a 
war going on, which was financed at the cost of inflation. As a reaction, in June 1988 all 
interest rates were unified for agricultural, livestock, and industrial production, thus 
eliminating the instrument. 
C. Second unintended mechanism: inflation 
In the preceding section it became clear that interest rates have to be regarded in real 
terms, i.e., correcting for inflation. The series concerning these two factors in table 4 
display that starting with 1985 real interest rates for all credit recipients became extremely 
negative. The principal sum could be regarded in relation to inflation also, in the foUowing 
way: 
repaid principal 
rate of repayment in real term» (RRR) = 
actual (inflated) value of principal 
Any difference between the numerator and the denominator should be compensated by 
indexating interest rates according to inflation. The difference can become high in an 
inflationary environment, making the principal sum an important factor engendering implicit 
subsidies. A farmer has a rationale to stimulate this process without even defaulting, if he 
simply waits some time before repaying the amount due. The 'inflated value of the 
principal' calculated at the moment of repayment has become high, the RRR falls, and the 
implicit subsidy increases. 
It has been estimated that in 1987 the RRR of every loaned cordoba on a short term was 
approximately eight percent, assuming zero default (estimate by Spoor, 1989:11). The 
resulting implicit subsidy of 92% was not differentiated among sectors. Taking into account 
default, implicit subsidies may have been even higher! 
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In conclusion, inflation became crucial for the sectoral distribution of the transfer of 
grants, provoking that resources were transferred to sectors which by no means were given 
an a priori political priority in the context of the agrarian transformation. The 'velocity' of 
this transfer has possibly been around 92% of every single disbursed cordoba, in 1987. 
D. Second instrument: social distribution of credit 
In order to estimate the extent of the impact of inflation on the transfer of grants per 
social group, we need to consider the participation of each group in total agricultural credit. 
We will do this for RC/individual, RC/cooperative, BC/private, and the APP-sector (state 
enterprises). 
In table 5 it can be seen, firstly, that the increased share of RC in total disbursements of 
agricultural-livestock credit was entirely due to lending to cooperatives CAS and CCS. 
Second, while in 1977/78 the state sector did not exist, after 1980 it became a major cliënt, 
absorbing 43 percent of all credit in 1983. Third, large producers belonging to the private 
sector saw their share steeply falling. With total lending to agriculture in real terms 
fluctuating but on average constant, all this holds not only in relative terms. 
Up to 1985, implicit subsidies due to inflation were moderate as compared to the second 
half of the Sandinist decade; these amounted to 9% for the state sector, 15% for cooper-
atives CAS and 16% for the CCS (assuming zero default). As subsequently until 1983 
these social sectors increased their share in total AC, they took progressively more advan-
tage of these subsidies. Thus, implicit subsidies were rising for the 'revolutionary' groups, 
as long as their credit absorption grew in relative terms (APP: till 1983, and CAS/CCS: till 
1986). 
As regards APP, it can be observed that after 1983 this sector received relatively less 
credit; in 1990 its share was almost half of what it was in 1983. On the other hand, large 
producers started to recover, seeing their participation as a group reach nearly fifty percent 
in 1990. The cooperatives and the individual small farm sector (RC) lost some ground too, 
although slowly. Not taking into account 1986, its share of 34% in 1984 and 1985 falls to 
27% in 1988, the year of the monetary reform. 
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TABLE 5: agricultural-livestock credit by sectors (1977-1990) 
(in percentages of total yearly disbursements) 
year: '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 •87 '88 '90 
Large producen BC: 90 96 87* 73* 43 35 26 26 30 29 34 47 48 
State enterpriiea APP: 0 0 - - 34 34 43 40 36 27 32 26 24 
...S<™H(med;.prodL .RC;m IO M 4_ 13_ 27_ _ 2 3 _ 31 3}m 34 34 44 
- J M L _2J„ 28., 
RC/Individual: 10 4 NA NA 14 14 10 9 10 ND 11 ND ND 
RC/Cooperative: 0 0 NA NA 9 17 21 23 24 ND 23 ND ND 
Sourcei: Enriquez and Spaiding, 1987:114 (year 1977); CIERA, 1989a:318 (1978-88); dau-bank DEA/UNAN, Managua (year 1990) 
* = percentage includea two aecton - > BC and APP; NA and ND: aee table 1 
Meanwhile, implicit subsidies became greater and generalized from 1985 onwards, due to 
accelerating inflation. All types of BND-clients benefitted, no matter to which social group 
they belonged and which nominal interest rate they paid. Moreover, large private producers 
began to recuperate their share in total AC, just as implicit subsidies were as high as 92% or 
more. 
In 1988-1990 this trend was not altered, considering the BC share at a level of 48%, an 
exceptionally high inflation rate (perhaps 31,000% in 1988 and 1,687% in 1989), and 
incomplete indexation measures (see Visser, 1990:36-37). The APP-sector benefitted less 
when potentially the highest implicit subsidy could be attained, because of its relatively 
lower share in total AC during these two years. It seems that the cooperative sector 
maintained its participation, and continued to benefit from higher implicit subsidies during 
the most inflationary years. 
With respect to the RC program as a whole (cooperatives + individuals), its share feil to 
27 and 28% in 1988 and 1989, respectively. To some extent this was due to the monetary 
reform (i.e. the indexation measures of June and September 1988), which created insecurity 
among individual small farmers, who subsequently reduced their demand for credit. After 
28 
eight years of low interest rates, high implicit subsidies and (initially) tolerance towards 
default, the measures provoked anxiety and resentment. In Nueva Guinea, during a meeting 
between farmers and bank staff willing to explain the measures, the farmers announced it 
would be the very last time they used bank credit. Thinking that interest rates had become 
excessively high, small farmers started to avoid the risk of indebtness. 
It has been estimated that nevertheless, and still assuming zero default, the implicit 
subsidy after June 1988 was about 69% for short term credit (Spoor, 1989:4). It seems mat 
large producers had a better understanding of what happened, as they maintained a high BC-
share of 48 percent. In fact these producers had started increasing their demand for credit 
since the very moment inflation accelerated (1986). We conclude that large producers knew 
better how to benefit from implicitly subsidized credit. 
Although small farmers withdrew from the financial system and large producers did the 
opposite, the small farmer union UNAG started to protest against the indexation measures. 
The union had become inured to the compensatory function of credit as a source of income 
because producer prices had been low from 1980 to 1987 (see Bakker et al., 1987). 
Subsidized credit was essential when prices of inputs, consumer products, machinery 
services, and fuel were rocketing (UNAG, 1989). In our view their position was problem-
atic in three ways. It might well have been better to fight for higher producer prices man to 
defend a compensation in the form of subsidized credit (i.e., a grant). Firstly, because the 
other half of the peasantry, which did not get any subsidized credit, would have gained from 
higher prices. Secondly, because subsidized credit in Nicaragua contributed to augment the 
fiscal deficit, and thus fuelled inflation (which in turn raises implicit subsidies: a vicious 
circle is created). And thirdly, because large producers responded in a most appropiate 
manner to inflation by raising their demand for credit above their needs; the subsidies were 
increasingly enjoyed by the better-off, not by the poorest. 
At the end of section 5.1, we asked ourselves if the adverse influence of inflation on the 
pattern of credit distribution became structural. Here, we have hypothetically stated mat 
inflation was at most an intennediate variable, which influenced the behaviour of large and 
small producers in a different way. Yet, the tendency for BC-credit to become more 
important lasted for five years, so the answer is affirmative; inflation was crucial in raising 
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the magnitude of the implicit subsidy, causing a shift in the distribution of credit, as the 
response of large producers was more appropiate in taking advantage of the situation. 
In assessing the overall effects as regards the sectoral allocation of credit, we have to take 
into account also the prerevolutionary situation. Above we were commenting on the 
diminishing share of small farmers and state enterprises in total AC, but this tendency only 
manifested itself after the first years of the revolution, i.e., after the participation of small 
farmers and state enterprises had grown. During those years, these groups enjoyed implicit 
subsidies (be it of a lesser extent than the subsidies after 1986) and even debt cancellation. 
Considered on a pre/postrevolutionary scale, absorption of agricultural credit by large 
private producers feil from 90% in 1977 to 48% in 1990. 
Summarizing the findings of this section in another terminology, we may say that from a 
social point of view, initially a redistribution of income took place in favour of small 
producers, cooperatives, and the state sector. Later on, the transfer of grants was redirected 
towards large private producers, as they steadily increased their share in total AC when 
implicit subsidies were as high as 90 percent of each cordoba lent before June 1988, and 
twothirds of the lump sum after this month. 
It is important to note that from an economie point of view also inefficiënt sectors 
benefitted more from implicit subsidies, e.g., the livestock-sector in Nueva Guinea. Our 
data collected in this region show that during the period from 198S to 1988, seventy percent 
of all agricultural credit was disbursed to the livestock-sector." This did not correspond 
with the objective of national food security. Moreover, the region's poor soil fertility 
induced small food producing farmers to sell their plots to cattle-breeders, the latter making 
an extensive use of land without improving its quality. Small farmers in their turn cut new 
areas of rain forests, just to stay there a couple of years, till land productivity lowered to 
such an extent that the time came to sell again. So, the uneven distribution of credit in 
favour of the livestock-sector reinforced an ecologically harmful development and economi-
M
 Twothirds of livestock-credit in Nueva Guinea w u disbursed as long term credit, meaning that the subsidy-component 
rosé up to a hundred percent at time» of high inflation. Secondly, we calculated that during those years the average loan for 
cattle-breeding was 10 times higher than for short term agricultural credit, so in absolute terms subsidies were larger too for an 
individual. In general, the funding of production logic made that loan» disbursed to cattle-breeders and large producers were 
10 to 20 times larger than loani to small farmer» (Carter, 1982). 
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cally inefficiënt productive activities in this district (see for more examples: Spoor, 
1991:129). 
In conclusion: this section has shown that the four transfer-mechanisms could not but 
result in a complex and in part unpredictable network of transfers to different groups of 
beneficiaries, individuals and economie sectors. Seen on a pre/postrevolutionary scale, the 
social distribution of credit has become more equal and corresponded to revolutionary 
priorities, notwithstanding the fact that afterwards small individual farmers and state 
enterprises lost part of their share in the cake, subsequently missing the opportunity to enjoy 
extremely high implicit subsidies. Large farmers did, at the end of the eighties. Finally, 
with reference to the economie allocation of funds, it seems to have been far from efficiënt. 
Examples confirm that subsidized credit distorts an efficiënt allocation of scarce resources. 
5.3: Productive responses 
The third OCP was to promote production, stimulate productivity, and recuperate levels of 
pre-war food and agroexport production. In this section, although we may observe that 
productivity rosé where credit was made available and used where before it was not, we 
cannot pretend to identify causal relations here. Firstiy we will argue why this is so, and 
secondly we will present a purely descriptive synopsis of the productive record of agricul-
ture in Nicaragua (1980-1990). 
A: Theoretical considerations about credit-impact studies 
Suppose that small farmers' suboptimal allocative and technical efficiency is primarily a 
result of financial constraints, and that entrepreneural qualities and/or productive and 
commercial conditions are not relevant factors. According to Carter (1989:19), in such a 
situation credit would relieve the financial pressure and enable a farmer to: 1) purchase all 
the necesary inputs and improve allocative efficiency; 2) adopt a new (presumably already 
desired) technological package and raise technical efficiency; and/or 3) intensify the use of 
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fixed production factors (land, family labour, skills)." The third objective of Sandinist 
credit policy with respect to small farmers was indeed based on the assumption mat mainly 
financial constraints impeded them to walk down these roads, inhibiting their capitalisation 
and a greater market integration. 
But what if differences between farmers with respect to productive or entrepreneural 
qualities, and/or productive/commercial conditions are factors contributing to suboptimality? 
Then if no one receives credit, productive differences exist also. Consequently, if credit 
access is generalized, the question arises who actually uses it. The borrowers may be the 
ones facing more favourable productive and commercial circumstances, or be more talented 
farmers/entrepreneurs, or both. Receiving credit, they may be able to increase productivity 
and possibly their income, which leads to a process of differentiation in the small farm 
sector. In the Nicaraguan context, where self-selection was the main rationing principle, 
and where terms of credit were politically determined, borrowers may have been systemati-
cally different from non-borrowers. 
Given this setting, it is next to impossible to determine which part of productive changes 
could and should be attributed to credit. Firstly, because in his econometrie study Carter 
(1989) could not identify whether the observed greater productivity of borrowers was due to 
latent personal attributes or whether it was an effect of credit (that is, a general effect, no 
matter who borrows)." Secondly, because in general different productive and commercial 
circumstances may also explain a better production record of borrowers vs. non-borrowers. 
And third, because a package of services may be delivered to the rural sector at the same 
time as credit is disbursed (e.g. inputs, technical assistance, literacy campaign). These 
problems constitute the attribution problem, and mutually increase the complexity of the 
issue at stake. 
Two more problems can arise when one tries to determine the productive impact of credit. 
First, as rural households are both consumption and production units, one cannot ignore 
17
 Credit may have the third theoretical impact if wed for coiuumption, improving nutrition and thui raiiing productivity, 
or by allowing the farmer to allocate family labour where marginal return ii higheit in the long run, while credit financet the 
coat of maintenance in the ahort run. 
" He controlled for obaervable differencei in productive and marketing condition». 
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changes in consumption. Credit is Hquidity," and liquidity is like water. It fiows where it 
can and one can not distinguish one liter of water in a stream, trying to tracé where it comes 
from and where it is heading for. This characteristic of credit is called the fimgibüity of 
credit, meaning that ioans may simply substitute for a household's savings or other sources 
of liquidity' (David and Meyer, 1983:85), and that all resourses in principle can be used for 
consumption and production. 
Second, referring again to productive effects only, one should distinguish between agricul-
tural production and non-agricultural activities. The first is already problematic when 
policymakers disburse credit to food producers in order to increase national food security, 
while their clients may decide to shift production to non-food staples, e.g., traditional or 
non-traditonal exports. The question is thus: what kind of productive responses are desired 
(e.g. by policymakers, project staff)? A conflict may arise between policy-makers' 
preferences and decisions taken at the household level where people face (productive and 
consumptive) opportunities and risks. 
B: Synopsis of the recent productive performance of Nicaraguan agriculture 
As relatively more credit was disbursed towards the agricultural sector (at the cost of 
commercial credit), first the productive record of agriculture as a whole will be examined. 
Table 6 shows that although the value of agricultural production rosé till 1983, the then 
reached highest postrevolutionary level was still about equal to the prewar 1977 value. 
Afterwards production stagnated, implying that the goal to recuperate production after the 
revolution was not reached (which, of course, is probably due to other factors than credit 
alone). 
In relative terms, the agricultural sector was equally important in its contribution to GDP 
in 1983 as in 1978. Given the rapidly increased share of total bank credit absorbed by 
agriculture (from 20 to 51 percent), this result leaves even less to claim for the productive 
impact of credit. It may be that: A) a positive effect was offset by the negative influence of 
" If it i» not diibuned in the form of money, or a money-check, but in kind, it can be made liquid if there U a market for 
thegood. 
33 
other factors; or B) that credit simply did not have a productive impact (as concluded by 
Barahona et al., 1988). 
TABLE6 
Agricultural production and credit absorption 
(1973-1986) 
1973 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Agricuhutal GDP 4.638 5.673 6.167 5.922 4.947 5.286 5.436 5.749 5.442 5.181 4.901 
(index, 1977 « 100) 82 100 109 104 87 93 96 101 96 91 86 
(aia % of GDP) 22% 21% 25% 30% 18% 19% 20% 25% 24% 24% 23% 
ACii % of total SFN-
credit 
NA 20% 20% NA NA 39% 49% 51% 49% 45% NA 
Sourcet: World Tables, 1989-90 edition, p. 416-417; Uble 1 
Notei: Agricultural GDP in millioni of 1980 Nicaraguan New Cordobai; NA = data not available 
A second important component of agricultural credit policy was to reach more small 
farmers, and increase the share of small credit. As has been argued, this was realized by 
the formation of cooperatives, whose function it was to contribute to national food security. 
This has been an important objective in Nicaragua under Sandinist rule. Food Staples are 
mainly provided by cooperatives and individual small farmers (Small Production: SP), so 
here we will examine the food production record. Table 7 displays some important 
tendencies concerning corn and beans, two crops which are mostly produced within the SP 
sector. 
TABLE 7: Corn and Beans 
Cultivated Area, Financed Area, National Production and the contribution of Small Farmers 
(1978-1988) 
197 
6 
197 
7 
1980 198 
1 
198 
2 
198 
3 
198 
4 
198 
5 
198 
6 
198 
7 
1988 
CORN: 
Cultivated Area (CA) 
Financed Area (FA) 
FA/CA 
369 
57 
15% 
303 
61 
20% 
336 
251 
74% 
286 
100 
35% 
241 
115 
48% 
266 
108 
41% 
270 
109 
40% 
188 
103 
55% 
225 
153 
68% 
261 
147 
56% 
316 
179 
57% 
CA (index, 1977-100) 
National Production (NP) 
NP (index, 1977«100) 
SP ai % of NP 
122 
437 
1 
111 
NA 
100 
394 
2 
100 
NA 
76 
3996 
99 
94% 
97 
420 
0 
104 
91% 
78 
400 
3 
102 
91% 
88 
508 
5 
129 
86% 
89 
458 
1 
114 
82% 
62 
424 
2 
105 
81% 
74 
470 
2 
117 
90% 
86 
616 
1 
152 
89% 
105 
6572 
162 
93% 
BBAN5: 
Cultivated Area (CA) 
Financed Area (FA) 
FA/CA 
140 
18 
13% 
88 
15 
17% 
78 
60 
77% 
108 
58 
54% 
98 
60 
61% 
126 
60 
48% 
118 
51 
43% 
103 
45 
44% 
142 
80 
56% 
97 
63 
65% 
157 
69 
44% 
CA (index, 1977-100) 
National Production (NP) 
NP (index, 1977= 100) 
SP ai « o f NP 
158 
117 
7 
132 
NA 
100 
895 
100 
NA 
88 
625 
70 
95% 
122 
905 
101 
89% 
112 
103 
0 
115 
95% 
143 
122 
6 
137 
94% 
134 
126 
0 
141 
97% 
117 
100 
8 
113 
97% 
161 
129 
0 
144 
98% 
110 
740 
83 
92% 
178 
1228 
138 
98% 
Sourcei: Bakker et al., 1987; Zalkin, 1986:161,200 
Notei: In the table calendar yean refer in fact to the agriculuiral leaion of that year and the next; 
Area in thouiandi of manzanai (1 manzana • 0.68 hectare); 
Production in thouiandi of quintidei (1 quintal • 46 kilo). 
Firstly, the corn recuperation record is good, as in 1980/81 and 1981/82 production was 
at the 1976/77 level, and continued progressing afterwards: moderately until 1985/86, and 
rapidly after this season. The politica! wish to reach small farmers with credit led to a rapid 
extension of the financed area (FA). On average, during the eighties some fifty percent of 
the cultivated area (CA) was fmanced by the BND, not taking into account the 1980 
'pifiata', when more manzanas were finan-ced than actually were cultivated. 
With respect to the CA-index, one should notice the drop in cultivated area with corn, 
probably as a result of war activities in the countryside. The NP-index nevertheless 
increases slightly, suggesting that overall productivity in corn production increased (with 
roughly 20%). Two explanations are in place here: 1) up to 1985/86 productivity increased 
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as a result of widespread experimentation with improved seeds and fertilizers in basic grain 
production, made possible by the avaüability of credit (Zalkin, 1986:199); 2) following the 
1985 price liberalisation for corn and beans, total production in 1987/88 and 1988/89 was 
far superior to former levels. 
In corn production, small farmers appear to have been more responsive to higher producer 
prices (Bakker et al., 1987:87) than to increased access to credit. This stance is confirmed 
by the data on the contribution of the small farmers (SP) to national production, which rosé 
from 81% in 1985/86 to 93% in 1988/89. The reason why farmers did répond less to 
subsidized credit was that net returns of traditional corn production from 1979/80 to 1984/85 
were negative (ibid, p. 61), while only 40 to 50 percent of all small farmers were reached 
with credit and thus compensated by means of implicit subsidies. The other half reacted 
elastically to the producer price liberalisation. 
It would not be correct to examine the impact of credit on corn production only. As was 
indicated in section A, credit could be used to change the product mix in favour of more 
capita! intensive crops. Nicaraguan small farmers may have started to grow more beans 
instead of corn, once credit was made available to them. Indeed, beans became more and 
more a cash erop for small farmers while corn was still produced mainly for subsistance 
(ibid, p. 67). 
Table 7 also presents data on bean production. The prewar level of the cultivated area 
with beans was soon reached. Production however, only slowly recuperated and hardly 
surpassed the 1976 level. On the other hand, national production did doublé during 1980-
1988, as a consequence of an equally great expansion of the cultivated area. Productivity 
did not rise, although the use of modern inputs was encouraged and generalized as in corn 
production. Still, the greater role of credit at most stimulated an extensive production 
development (that is, there is a chance that it played this role). 
Considering the two crops together, we may conclude that production increased, chiefly as 
a result of the price liberalisation and an expansion of the cultivated area in case of corn and 
beans, respectively. Credit may have played an intermediary role though, e.g., by 
increasing the use of modern inputs in corn production, an effect that appears particularly at 
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times of a price liberalisation. It has been supposed (Zalkin, 1986:202) that a greater 
availability of credit to small producers (especially those organized in cooperatives) induced 
the expansion of the area cultivated with beans." 
In 1988/89 domestic crops occupied 20 percent more of total cultivable acreage, as 
compared with the last three seasons of the prerevolutionary period an average of 52% was 
allocated; meanwhile, credit absorption by domestic erop production more than doubled 
(from 15 to 31 percent: Spoor, 1989:1). Consequently, we have iittle reason to mink that at 
a macro-level greater credit absorption by domestic crops led to a sufficiently high produc-
tive response, taking corn and beans as examples. 
Finally, a third important component of agricultural credit policy was the priority given to 
the state sector APP. Some capital-intensive agroindustrial projects have been initiated in 
this sector; imports of capita! goods for agriculture constituted almost 5 percent of GDP, a 
rate which was two to three times higher than in other countries in Central America (Stahler-
Sholk and Spoor, 1989). Most of these imports went to the state sector, but the new 
enterprises were not capable to raise their productivity to such a degree that debts could be 
repaid. APP-debts were restructured in 1983, and in 1986 a special credit program 
('programa de crédito dirigido') had to be created to improve the productive record of the 
state sector. From that moment on, a credit request would only be approved if ex ante 
productive norms would be agreed upon. We have no data about productive tendencies 
within the state sector after 1986, and therefore cannot determine whether the program was 
successfull or a failure. What we do know, however, is that after 1986 the share of APP in 
total AC feil. 
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 If go, itill the aocial coata of this poaaibly positive productive effect would have to be calculated in order to make a final 
judgment about it* deiirability (e.g. opportunity coata of the extentive development of beans production; environmental cotta of 
this expanaion and of the adoption of more 'chemie»!' technological packages; coata of aubaidiei, etcetera). 
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6 . SUSTAINABILITY OF THE SANDINIST FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The results of section 5 reveal that a higher number of small farmers received (at least) 
equal amounts of credit than before the revolution; that ünplicit subsidies have been 
considerable especially after 1985, accruing more and more to large producers; and that at a 
first sight the expansionary credit policy was not accompanied by a comparable expansion of 
output. In section 4 we argued that the SFN-debt with the Central Bank was rising, 
indicating that the system was not financially viable. Although to a lesser extent man the 
central government's expenditure, SFN-operations contributed to inflation. 
This view contrasts with the position of Barahona et al. (1989) who argued that credit 
stopped being an inflationary factor after its total value was falling in real terms. Although 
this argument is incorrect, it does draw attention to an extremely important repercussion of 
inflation on the performance of the financial system. Inflation induced an erosion of the 
capital base of the SFN, when BCN lending to the SFN was insufficiënt to maintain the real 
value of its capital. This led necessarily to diminishing real values of credit disbursements 
to bank clients. In table 3 we saw this happen as the average loan size within the RC 
program feil from 16.4 cordobas in 1986 to 8.8 cordobas in 1988 (in constant 1980 values). 
Total AC feil from 3.5 millions of 1980-cordobas in 1986 to 2.5 millions of 1980-cordobas 
in 1988. 
In Nueva Guinea, the reduction of real values of agricultural and livestock credit bas been 
impressive. For the period 1985-1989 we observed an overall reduction of 75 percent (60 
percent in case of short term credit, and 92 percent for long term credit). Consequently, 
average amounts of credit disbursed per manzana diminished. In fact, credit was rationed 
by inflation, and this can only be observed on an ad hoc basis, because of the unintended 
character of this kind of extensive rationing. A perverse effect is that the real value of loans 
in relation to production costs diminishes. In May 1990, some farmers told us that the 
amount of credit per manzana was not high enough to take the trouble of going to the bank, 
in part because of the decreased value of the loan, but also as production costs were rising 
sharply as a result of the adjustment program initiated in February 1988. 
Implicitly this phenomenon at the micro-level gave way to a major change in credit 
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policy, in the context of an adjustment program. From February 1988, credit policy would 
serve the macro-economie goal of reducing the global deficit. If the SFN would continue to 
function as it did during 1980-1988, the system would decapitalize even more and real 
values of loans would become insigniflcant. So in the new situation, farmers were expected 
to depend less on SFN-capital and more on their own, and real repayment rates would have 
to be higher. 
Two instruments were used to realize the latter goal: indexation of interest rates and 
quantitative restrictions. As was shown in section 5.2, the first measure was not effective in 
inducing positive real interest rates. The second measure was implemented in February 
1988, when short term credit was nominally cut by 10 percent and long term credit by 30 
percent. In Nueva Guinea, we observed that above all long term livestock-credit was 
reduced. This was instigated mainly by the so-called 'Casa Matriz', which approved or 
disapproved branch requests to disburse amount X of credit for purpose Y. Cuts varied 
from a hundred percent of the proposal (some cases of long term livestock-credit) to some 
30 to 50 percent in case of short term credit (Visser, 1990:46-47). 
Inflation in 1988 amounted to 31,000 percent or thereabout. The total real value of short 
term agricultural credit disbursed in Nueva Guinea in 1989 was just 20 percent of its 1988 
level; in case of long term credit the 1989 total value of disbursements in real terms was 
some 27 percent (ibid, p. 28). It may be that the nominal cuts have helped a little, but we 
suppose that the hyperinflation was mainly responsable for the decreasing real values of 
credit disbursements by the SFN. 
In section 5.2 we have seen that real repayment rates were still low after the implementa-
tion of indexation measures. On the other hand, in December 1989 the real value of savings 
deposits in Nueva Guinea constituted only 9 percent of all credit disbursements in that year 
(it had been 28 percent in 1985). During the same period the number of deposits decreased 
by 75 percent; in the light of negative real value of passive interest rates, this is not 
surprising. In conclusion: savings could not substitute the diminishing flow of funds of the 
Central Bank. The sustainability of the Sandinist agricultural credit policy was poor, partly 
because of dysfunctions of the policy itself, but also due to factors outside the sphere of 
agriculture and credit policy, e.g., government resource mobilisation by means of inflation 
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in order to increase military spending. 
7 . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The development of a viable formal financial system has not been a high priority in 
Nicaragua under Sandinist rule. Only after the monetary reform of February 1988 it seemed 
to gain importance. In this study we examined the problems and results associated with the 
Sandinist policy goals for the formal agricultural credit system. Basically, the system had to 
serve the non-fmancial goals of 'democratization', capitalization of 'revolutionary' produc-
tive sectors, and promotion of overall agricultural productivity. 
As regards its achievements, we observed first of all that access to credit of small farmers 
was effectively widened compared with the prerevolutionary situation. This was not done by 
means of extensive rationing, a frequently applied mechanism of credit delivery to a large 
number of farmers.3' In the Nicaraguan revolutionary context there was enough political 
will to augment the supply of loan funds when demand for credit increased, at least until 
1986. This prevented the size of an average 'small loan' from falling. Furthermore, we 
noticed that the cooperative sector has enjoyed ample access to credit throughout the 
eighties. This cannot be said in case of the parastatals (APP), though. lts productive 
inefficiency caused its absorption of credit to be more and more conditioned. 
Considering the 'productive' goal of agricultural credit policy, it seems to have become 
more dominant throughout the eighties. Nonetheless, no causal relation can be identified 
between credit as a determinant, and production as a variable to be determined. Comparing 
the changes over time in these variables we may conclude that the expansion of agricultural 
credit did not induce a rise in production. This conclusion is valid as regards total value 
added in agriculture, as well as regarding corn and beans production within the small farm 
sector. 
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 See: Von Pischke, 1983:179. Nor did the prevailing low re»l interest rites lead to loan concentration in the hand» of 
reUtively few borrower», as is to be expected according to Gonzalez-Vega fin: Adams, et al., 1984:78-90). The latter author'a 
work is baaed on the incidence of decentralized decision making, which makei up the difference. 
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The crucial factor in the revolutionary context was that credit became heavily subsidized. 
Four mechanisms played a role in determining the effect of credit policy on the income-
distribution: the incidence of default, low nominal interest rates, implicit subsidies, and the 
social distribution of credit. Analyzing these effects, a rather complex picture emerged of 
sometimes parallel and in other cases contradictory tendencies. In summary: it seems that 
cooperatives, individual small farmers and the APP state enterprises were subsidized by 
tolerating default and formalizing it by officially announced debt cancellation. This 
mechanism did not apply to large farmers. Low nominal interest rates were significant as a 
means of transfer of grants, as inflation rates were well above interest rates throughout die 
eighties. 
Inflation became a crucial factor after it surpassed the hundred percent level in 1986. 
Default lost its importance as a transfer of income-mechanism, and subsidies became mainly 
implicit. More importantly, they became generalized, so transfer of grants was no longer 
exclusively relevant for 'revolutionary sectors'. Moreover, after 1986, a shift in the social 
distribution of agricultural credit took place, in favour of large farmers. Large producers 
simply responded more rationally to inflation than small farmers. Normally, subsidized 
credit leads to quantitative rationing by bank managers which affects small farmers' access 
to credit, leading to an increase in the share of large producers in total available credit. In 
the revolutionary context in Nicaragua though, access remained open; small farmers rationed 
themselves, while the larger ones did the opposite. 
The following sequence may be identified: the inflationary spiral prompted implicit 
subsidies to be almost equal to the size of the loan. These implicit subsidies effectuated 
differential beha-vioural responses, comparing large and small farmers. The first group 
increased its demand for credit up to the maximum allowed (on the basis of total acreage, 
technology used, and use of own funds). This had two important consequences: 1. the 
initial redistribution of credit in favour of small and medium farmers plus the state sector 
was partly offset; and 2. the share of die large farm sector in total agricultural credit 
increased as the implicit subsidy per cordcba was highest. As a result of the second 
tendency, since 1986 a social redistribution of income favouring large farmers took place. 
Apart from open access to formal credit, small individual farmers did not gain a lot, 
considering the above observations. Those who did not organize themselves in cooperatives, 
remained outside the formal credit system, did not enjoy any subsidy, while producer prices 
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for com and beans were below production costs. Those who did, received credit, together 
witfa a reduced number of individual peasants. This small farmer clientèle started to refrain 
from the formal system starting in 1986, a tendency tfaat became stronger after the monetary 
reform. Some were abruptly left without credit as the new Chamorro-government came to 
power, demanded all amounts due to be repaid before more credit was to be rendered, and 
started redirecting the BND-loan portfolio towards export crops, especially cotton. 
Four mechanisms of transfer of income associated with the delivery of credit contributed, 
together with increased military expenses due to the contra-war, to inflation. The latter 
factor made the formal credit system definitely unsustainable. The consequences of an 
unsustainable system may be severe, as yet credit covered between eighty and a hundred 
percent of production costs; a technological backwash, a fall in production, as well as lower 
incomes are probable. If relevant, these effects could be interpreted as boomerang-effects of 
the Sandinist credit policy. Furthermore, imagine they would be cushioned by the informal 
sector. That would in fact make up a fourth boomerang-effect, as informal forms of rural 
finance not only received zero attention in the revolutionary context but were also held to be 
essentially exploitative in nature. 
Even without the war, the agricultural credit system would not have been sustainable. 
Not only the discouraging effect of inflation on the level of savings, the political use of 
credit, its highly dirigist nature, but also the total failure to perceive it as a product of 
financial intermediation, are all of them problematic as such. A view of credit as a financial 
instrument necessarily leads us to the recognition that a credit transaction comprises a 
promise to repay in the future, and is thus based upon confidence. Such a transaction 
presupposes a personal relationship which serves as a basis to build confidence (Yotopoulos, 
1991). In its turn, the latter is a means to compensate for the risk of default, i.e., the risk 
that credit may not be credïble. The neglect of these features of credit as a financial 
instrument resulted in high delinquency rates. 
Sandinist policy makers saw credit as a productive input. Portfolio decisions were taken 
at a central level, and were based upon political criteria. These have made the financial 
system to function in the same way as hypothetically predicted by Von Pischke, although his 
hypothesis presupposes a 'consistent selection of suboptimal alternatives' within portfolio-
management at the level of the bank branch. We consider the case of Nicaragua as unique 
in showing that Von Pischke's hypothesis was based upon a still too narrow view of the 
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political economy of a financial system. 
It is remarkable, however, that even in this revolutionary context (and thus in unpredict-
able ways) the performance of the Sandinist financial system has coincided more or less with 
Von Pischke's predictions that: 1. the clientèle contracts; 2. the quality of services deterio-
rates; and 3. the range of services is not expanding. The first prediction has only partly 
been valid in Nicaragua, but the second and the third were. The case of Nicaragua proves 
also, however, that his theory does not sufficiently take into account the specific political 
forces that may shape the use and, indeed, the abuse of the financial system in a developing 
country, and corresponding policy results. 
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